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When our metaphysical tools are dened in modal terms, there is a limit to how
much we can oer to the study of mathematics. For example, since any (pure)
mathematical facts strictly imply (i.e. entail) any other, it seems that such a notion
will not get us very far in this area. If, however, we can lay on our hands on some
more discerning tools, which can prize apart facts with a common modal prole,
then there is hope that we can say something more illuminating. is paper is an
attempt to take an initial step in the direction of realizing this hope.1 In particular,
I focus on a plausible, and popular, general approach to mathematics, which I term
‘paraphrase anti-realism’. And I examine this with the aid of the notion of ground-
ing; the notion, that is, ofmetaphysical explanation.e results of this examination
are surprising and, I believe, shed light on the approach.
e position of paraphrase anti-realism, then, can be introduced as follows. It
is plausible that standard mathematical claims, such as ‘there are innitely many
primes’ or ‘every consistent set of sentences of has a model’, are true; but that, nev-
ertheless, if one ries through the fundamental furniture of the world, one will not
nd amongst this mathematical objects, such as numbers, sets or models.e nat-
ural way ofmaking sense of this would seem to bewith the thought: this is possible,
because such standard claims have paraphrases thatmake clear how their truth does
not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects.e aim of this pa-
per is to tease out some consequences of this approach for explanatory structure,
or, more precisely, for the relation between explanatory structure and logical struc-
ture.
It is tempting to think that this relation is straightforward. us, conjunctions
and disjunctions would seem to be explained, or grounded, by their (true) immedi-
1I do not however claim that it is the rst such step: see, e.g., Rosen [2011].
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ate components, while generalizations are grounded by their (true) instances. For
example, snow is black or white because it is black, and something is white for the
same reason. Indeed, such examples of logically complex claims being grounded
by logically simpler ones are typically regarded as paradigms of the notion of meta-
physical explanation, used to introduce it in the rst place. And, of course, this sim-
ple story relating logical and explanatory structure seems as obvious in the case of
mathematics as elsewhere.us, it can seemundeniable that 17 or 18 is odd because
17 is, or that every natural number greater than 1 has a unique prime decomposition
in part because 42 does, and so on. I argue, however, that paraphrase anti-realism
fundamentally rewrites this story. Not only do these basic claims relating logical
and explanatory structure fail on this approach; there are even cases where they
are reversed. For example, there are cases where generalizations explain their in-
stances, or disjunctions their disjuncts.
e primary conclusion of the paper is simply that paraphrase anti-realism has
this apparently striking consequence for explanatory structure. But one reason
this seems signicant—and why it might seem to constitute an objection to this
approach—is as follows. In general, anti-realist takes onmathematics are of course
intended to challenge our naive conception of this. But those that are our focus
here, which take as their starting point the idea that standard mathematical claims
are true, seem to want to challenge this only insofar as it concerns the relation of
mathematics to fundamental reality. e idea is thus that while certain ‘external’
claims about mathematics—claims about howmathematics relates to fundamental
reality—must be given up, ‘internal’ claims—claims about mathematical reality in
and of itself—are to be le untouched. Claims aboutwhichmathematical facts hold
in virtue of which others, however, seem very clearly to be on the ‘internal’ side of
this division. ey are a basic part of our understanding of mathematical reality,
in and of itself, it seems. And so one might hope, or even expect, that paraphrase
anti-realism would preserve such explanatory claims.
I argue then that there are, for example, general facts, along the lines of every
number has a successor that, under paraphrase anti-realism, are not grounded by
their instances; indeed, quite the reverse. e argument proceeds by unpacking
such generalizations into their paraphrases, and using these to locate them in the
explanatory structure. I should acknowledge at the outset, however, that there is a
sense inwhich (from the perspective of paraphrase anti-realism) claims such as ‘ev-
ery number has a successor’ are not ‘ultimately’ generalizations: from the internal
mathematical perspective they are generalizations, but the underlying paraphrases
have a dierent logical form.ere is thus a sense in which, for all that I will argue,
the anti-realist approaches in question are compatible with the standard principles
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relating logical and explanatory structure: i.e. with claims whose underlying form
is that of a generalization being grounded by their instances, and so on.
Some readers might worry that this undercuts the signicance of the paper’s
conclusion, or, at least, blunts its force as an objection.2 For (the line of thought
would run) the only reason to think that every number’s having a successor is
grounded by 0 having a successor, 1 having a successor, etc. is that we take the
former claim to be a universal generalization. But if our position is that this claim
is not ultimately (i.e. when unpacked into its paraphrase) universal, then we should
be quite happy to give up on its being grounded by its (apparent) instances.
I think this worry is misplaced, however. e idea behind paraphrase anti-
realism, as I have said, seems to be to preserve our internal judgements aboutmath-
ematics, while revising our external ones (concerning the relation of mathematics
to fundamental reality), and judgements about which mathematical facts explain
which others seemrmly to be on the internal side of this divide. An analogymight
help to drive this point home. From the perspective of paraphrase anti-realism,
there is a sense in which, for example, Goldbach’s conjecture (i.e. every even num-
ber greater than two is the sum of two primes) is not ultimately universal. us,
one could in principle say that the conjecture is false, despite the fact that 4 is the
sum of two primes, 6 is the sum of two primes etc.—while at the same time main-
taining (in the manner envisaged) that every universal is true i its instances are.
Nevertheless, it would surely be unattractive to say that Goldbach’s conjecture is
false, while these latter claims are true, precisely because the idea that such (ap-
parent) universals are true i their instances are would seem to be a basic aspect
of our understanding of mathematics. And the view that Goldbach’s conjecture is
true, without being grounded by 4 being the sum of two primes, by 6 being etc.,
would seem to be similarly unattractive, even if this is compatible with (ultimate)
universals always being grounded by their instances; because, in this case too, the
relationship between these claims would seem to be a basic part of our understand-
ing of mathematical reality.
e structure of the paper is as follows. In §1 I sketch a number of strate-
gies for providing paraphrases of mathematical claims. e aim is to show how a
whole family of approaches give rise to reversals of the commonly assumed logico-
explanatory claims. So I do not discuss any particular extant approach in detail. I
do however indicate where proposals along the lines of those I consider have been
put forward: and it would be straightforward to apply the arguments of the paper to
these extant proposals. In §2 I then draw out the consequences, for the relationship
2I am grateful to a referee for raising this.
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between logical and explanatory structure, of the strategies that I have presented.
Finally, in §3 I discuss a number of issues arising from the arguments of the paper.
1 Paraphrase Strategies
How might one supply mathematical claims with paraphrases? Here is a natural
idea. ‘e number of planets is even’, for example, is true, despite the failure of
numbers to fundamentally exist, because all that one is really saying is: given the
assumption that there are numbers, the one of these that corresponds to the planets
is even. Or to put it even more simply: if there are numbers, then that which
corresponds to the planets is even.
In this section I give a number of strategies for making this basic idea more
precise. For the purposes of illustration, and for much of the paper, I focus on
claims that are about (natural) numbers together with non-mathematical objects,
but that are not about any other mathematical objects. However, one will presum-
ably want to give a uniform account of mathematical paraphrases, and so if one
pursues one of the strategies below for claims about numbers, then one will also
use that strategy for claims about other mathematical objects, such as real numbers
or sets. And, indeed, everything that I say about numerical claims can be straight-
forwardly adapted to apply to claims about other sorts of mathematical objects.
e basic idea that we want to make precise, then, is that the paraphrase of ‘the
number of planets is even’ is along the lines: if there are numbers, then that which
corresponds to the planets is even. In all of the strategies I consider for how to do
this, the bare existential ‘there are numbers’ is replaced with something more in-
formative, namely, a standard set of axioms about numbers. For this purpose, I use
second-order Peano arithmetic (PA2).3 Such a replacement would seem essential.
For in talking about numbers we of course rely not merely on the assumption that
they exist, but on all sorts of further assumptions about them as well. But then
these further assumptions should also be built into our paraphrases. And the nat-
ural way of doing that would seem to be by using a set of axioms from which these
assumptions can be derived. Further, there are a range of reasons for using PA2
in particular. First, it seems to be the theory that best captures our ‘folk theory’ of
number.4 Second, it is complete.5 If we instead used an incomplete theory, such as
3e axioms of PA2 are listed in the appendix.
4See, e.g., Dedekind [1888].
5at is, for any sentence α of the language of PA2, either α or ¬α is a logical consequence of
PA2.
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rst-order Peano arithmetic (PA1), then true but unprovable sentences, such as the
Gödel sentence of PA1, would lead to counterexamples to at least some of the pro-
posals below. ird, PA2 is nite, which makes our life easier since it means that
we do not need a ‘trick’ to deal with innitely many sentences, such as a truth pred-
icate, innitary conjunction or quantication into sentence position. Having said
all of that, however, if for some reason one preferred to do things in terms of some
alternative set of axioms, then the arguments of the paper could straightforwardly
enough be adapted to that version of the strategies below.
Here then are the strategies. In giving these, I let α be some arbitrary claim
about numbers and non-mathematical objects: e.g. ‘the number of planets is even’
or ‘there are innitely many primes’.
1.1 Consequence Strategy
According to this, what we are really saying when we assert α is: if our basic axioms
about numbers hold, together with ‘the facts’, then it follows logically that α. Here
‘the facts’ means the facts about non-mathematical objects.
To state this more precisely we need two things: a way of talking about logical
consequence, and a way of talking about the facts. To this end, I use⇒ as a logical
consequence connective. So β ⇒ γ means: if β, then it follows logically that γ.us
β ⇒ γ is equivalent to: {β} ⊧ γ. But using a connective seems preferable, since it
yields a paraphrase that uses rather than mentions the relevant sentences. Surely,
when we make claims about numbers, we are not in fact making claims about sen-
tences about numbers. Further, I take⇒ to be multigrade in its rst argument, i.e.
for any n ≥ 1 and β1, . . . , βn, (β1, . . . , βn)⇒ γ is well formed.
I assume that there is some nite set of sentences F whose members express
precisely the facts. One could get by without the assumption that F is nite (just
as one could use an innite set of axioms instead of PA2), but I make this because
it simplies things. Now let C be a new unary predicate symbol (i.e. not occurring
in PA2 or F), intended to mean: is concrete. For a formula φ, φC is the result of
restricting the quantiers in φ by C.6 And FC is {βC ∶ β ∈ F}. We give the para-
phrase in terms ofFC rather thanF since wewant to consider the result of combin-
ing the facts with our mathematical claims (i.e. PA2). But F might be inconsistent
with PA2: for example, if F contains a sentence only true in nite models, such as
∀x(x = b1 ∨ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∨ x = bn). Such problems are avoided by moving to FC , since if
6More explicitly, if φ is atomic, then φC is simply φ; if φ is ¬ψ, then φC is ¬ψC ; if φ is ψ → χ,
then φC is ψC → χC ; while if φ is ∀xψ, then φC is ∀x(Cx → ψC).
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β ∈ F is the sentence just mentioned, then FC will only contain βC , i.e.
∀x(Cx → x = b1 ∨ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∨ x = bn),
which is perfectly consistent with PA2. Finally, if β1, . . . , βn are the members of
FC ∪PA2, then I useM as shorthand for this list.e paraphrase of α, αP, that this
strategy proposes is then essentially:M⇒ α.
ere is however one further wrinkle. e strategies of this section rely on
claims about numbers leading a kind of ‘double life’. On the one hand, they have
a ‘supercial’, or ‘everyday’, use, on which they do not—the idea is—require the
fundamental existence of numbers. It is this use that the strategies are giving an
account of. On the other hand, however, these strategies rely on claims about num-
bers also having a fundamental use, on which ‘there are innitely many primes’, for
example, does require the fundamental existence of numbers. is is how we are
using claims about numbers when they occur within our paraphrases. For it would
seem circular to rely on the supercial use of α in giving an account of what that
very use of α amounts to.7
Indeed, quite independently of the specic strategies of this section, it is plau-
sible that on the general anti-realist approach tomathematics under consideration,
numerical claims will have these two distinct uses. For while we want to say that
‘there are innitelymany primes’ is true in everyday ormathematical contexts, nev-
ertheless (the approachmaintains), numbers do not fundamentally exist. But then,
when our aim is to describe how things are fundamentally, it seems rather to be
correct to say: there are no numbers (and a fortiori no primes).
For clarity, I use bold symbols for the fundamental use, and regular ones for
the supercial use.8 More precisely, then, the paraphrase proposed by this strategy,
αP, is
M⇒ α.
An alternative version of this idea would replace the notion of logical conse-
quence with that of strict implication, i.e. ⇒ would be replaced by ◻(_ → _).9
7In fact, this circularity worry is more pressing in the case of the subsequent strategies of this
section: since it is at least arguable that one can know about the merely logical behaviour of nu-
merical claims (under the supercial use) without knowing what this use amounts to (i.e. which
paraphrases capture it). However, for the sake uniformity, I give all of the strategies in terms of the
fundamental use.
8us, ocially, our language contains two distinct sentences, α and α, where the former cor-
responds to the fundamental use and the latter to the supercial one.
9For attempts to use paraphrases along these lines to elucidate standard mathematical claims,
see Putnam [1967] and Hellman [1989, 1996].
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However, since it would seem that if a numerical claim β is false, then it is nec-
essarily so, this version of the strategy requires PA2 and α to be generalized, i.e.
non-logical symbols would be replaced by variables, and the whole conditional
would be universally quantied. us, for simplicity I focus on the version of the
strategy in terms of logical consequence. But similar points could be made about
this alternative.
1.2 Counterfactual Strategy
According to this, when we say that there are innitely many primes, what we are
really saying is that if there were numbers, then there would be so many primes. I
use for the counterfactual conditional, and, as with⇒, I take this to be multi-
grade in its rst argument.us10
αP ∶ PA2 α.
We do not need FC in this case. For what β  γ means is essentially: in the
situation in which β is true, but that is in other respects as close as possible to the
actual situation, γ is also true. But the situation in which PA2 is true, yet which
is in other respects as close as possible to actuality, will be one in which the facts
about non-mathematical objects, i.e. FC , also obtain.
Obviously, this strategy requires that we can make sense of counterpossibles11.
at is, it requires that we do not classify all of these as vacuously true. (If all such
counterfactuals are true, then on this proposal so is ‘there are not innitely many
primes’, for example.) Fortunately, it seems clear that in this sort of case in par-
ticular we can indeed make sense of such counterfactuals. For example, it seems
clear that while (1) and (3) are true, (2) and (4) are not. us, given the plausible
assumption that the antecedents are all either necessary or impossible, at least one
of (2) and (4) is a false counterpossible.
(1) If PA2 were the case (i.e. if there were numbers and they satised the stan-
dard axioms), then there would innitely many primes.
(2) If PA2 were the case, then there would be no primes between 20 and 30.
(3) If there were no numbers, then there would be no primes.
(4) If there were no numbers, then there would still be a prime between 20 and
30.
10For this proposal, see Dorr [2008].
11I.e. counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents.
7
1.3 Fiction Strategy
e idea behind the nal strategy is that when wemake a numerical claim what we
are really saying is that this holds in the number ction. e natural way to make
this precise is to think of ctions as lists of sentences, and to use an operator ◻G
such that ◻Gβ means: according to the ction that G, β.e proposed paraphrase
is then12
αP ∶ ◻Mα.
2 Logical vs Explanatory Structure
Suppose that one of these strategies for giving paraphrases of mathematical claims
is correct. What are the consequences for the relationship between logical and ex-
planatory structure in this realm? To discuss explanation, I use the notion of partial
ground, and I write β ≺ γ to mean that β is a partial ground of γ.13 It is tempting
to think that the following ‘logico-explanatory’ (LE) principles hold. Here β and γ
are sentences, φ is a formula with at most x free, and t is a closed term.14
(∧L) If β ∧ γ, then β ≺ β ∧ γ.
(∧R) If β ∧ γ, then γ ≺ β ∧ γ.
(∨L) If β, then β ≺ β ∨ γ.
12For a proposal along these lines, see Chihara [1973]. (Rosen [1990] gives a similar treatment of
claims about possible worlds.) Alternative ctionalist approaches tomathematics are given by Field
[1989: 1–52] and Yablo [2001].e latter are not versions of paraphrase anti-realism in the sense of
this paper: for one thing, mathematical claims are not true according to these approaches. I believe
that versions of the arguments of the paper apply to these, but for reasons of space I do not make
that case here.
13I should note that I understand the notion of ground in a relatively liberal way: to cover any
sort of metaphysical, i.e. non-causal, explanation. For example, I take this notion to cover the ex-
planatory relations that hold betweenmathematical facts. If one objects to this understanding of the
notion, then one can replace my talk of grounding with talk simply of metaphysically explaining—
nothing essential would be lost. Note in particular that since it is widely accepted that grounding is
at least a species of metaphysical explanation, if a given instance does not metaphysically explain a
universal generalization, for example, then this instance does not ground the generalization either.
us, even understood simply in terms of metaphysical explanation, the counterexamples below
to the relevant logico-explanatory principles would amount to counterexamples to the widely held
principles about grounding.
14For such principles see, e.g., Fine [2010] and Rosen [2010].
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(∨R) If γ, then γ ≺ β ∨ γ.
(∀) If ∀xφ, then φ(x/t) ≺ ∀xφ.
(∃) If φ(x/t), then φ(x/t) ≺ ∃xφ.
As I noted in the introduction, not only do these seem plausible, they are oen
used to introduce the notion of grounding. And this plausibility seems just as great
in the case of mathematics as elsewhere. For example, it seems that what it is for 17
to be odd and 18 to be even is, on the one hand, for 17 to be odd and, on the other,
for 18 to be even. And the natural way of cashing this out would seem to be by
saying that the latter two claims ground the former. Similarly, it can seem hard to
deny that what it is for every number to be smaller than a prime is (at least in part)
for 0 to be smaller than a prime, for 1 to be, and so on. And again the natural way of
articulating this is in terms of ground. But wewill see that the strategies of §1 lead to
violations of these principles—indeed, to cases where they are reversed. is will
show that, while we might have hoped that these strategies would be externally
revisionary, but internally conservative, they are in fact internally revisionary as
well.
Before giving the argument that there are cases where the LE principles are
reversed, I should discuss the relationship between a mathematical sentence α and
its paraphrase αP. On the simplest account of this—and that which I will assume—
these sentences express the very same proposition. us, in particular, for any β,
β ≺ α i β ≺ αP, and α ≺ β i αP ≺ β. On this way of thinking, the logical
structure of amathematical sentence is thus dierent from that of the proposition it
expresses. For example, a conjunction (i.e. a conjunctive sentence)may not express
a conjunctive proposition. Nevertheless, one might naturally expect that the LE
principles would be preserved (e.g. the propositions expressed by mathematical
conjunctions would be grounded by those expressed by their conjuncts). Indeed
one might think that this is a precondition on the strategies being well chosen.
However, on an alternative way of thinking about the relationship between a
mathematical claim and its paraphrase, the latter rather explains the former, i.e.
αP ≺ α. On this alternative view, it seems right from the outset that the LE prin-
ciples fail under the strategies in question. For consider, e.g., (∧L). On this way of
thinking, β ∧ γ is grounded (presumably fully) by (β ∧ γ)P. But then it is plausible
that this is a complete account of the immediate grounds of β ∧ γ, in which case
this will not also be grounded by β or by γ. Of course, there can be no objection
in general to a claim having distinct full grounds (cf. disjunctions). But if α is to
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be understood in terms of a paraphrase αP, where these are taken to express dis-
tinct propositions, then it is surely plausible that every explanation of α should run
through αP, in which case the latter is the sole immediate ground of the former.
us, on the alternative view, the picture would seem to be as follows. ere
are two levels: paraphrased and paraphrasing. And while there are explanatory
connections between the inhabitants of the latter, there are no such between those
of the former. Rather, all explanatory connections from paraphrased facts lead to
paraphrasing ones. But then (∧L) must fail, as must each of the other principles.
Nevertheless, even on this alternative way of thinking, one might expect some-
thing close to these principles to hold.us, rather than (∧L), one would have:
(∧LP) If β ∧ γ, then βP ≺ (β ∧ γ)P.
at is, although the expected connection between conjunctions and conjuncts
would not hold at the paraphrased level, its ‘shadow’ at the paraphrasing level
would. And similarly in the cases of the other LE principles.
On this alternative view of the relationship between α and αP, versions of the
arguments below could still be given, but these would now be aimed not at the
original LE principles, but rather at their ‘shadows’ (in the above sense). ese
versions of the arguments would show that, far from the paraphrases of logically
complex claims always being explained by the paraphrases of logically simpler ones,
we sometimes have the exact opposite of this. us, although I assume the simple
account of the relationship between α and αP, the arguments of the paper are, in
an important sense, independent of this assumption.
As I said in the introduction, there is a sense in which everything that I argue
for is compatible with the orthodox account of logical and explanatory structure,
and thus with versions of the LE principles (e.g. versions restricted to claims that
do not, in the relevant sense, have paraphrases). e aim is certainly not then to
argue that this orthodox account is irredeemable. Insofar as the aim is to argue
against anything, it is paraphrase anti-realism. e main aim, however, is simply
to establish limits on the extent to which this approach is in the end internally
conservative.
2.1 Fiction Strategy
In making the case for the reversal of the LE principles, I start with the last strategy
of §1. e rst point to make is that, in general, logically complex claims do not
hold in ctions because logically simpler ones do. To illustrate, consider the (very)
short story S consisting solely of the following sentence: Holmes heard a knock at
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the door, andWatson answered it. I use H for the rst conjunct,W for the second,
and H ∧W for the whole sentence.
Of course, H, W and H ∧W are all true in S, i.e. ◻SH, ◻SW and ◻S(H ∧W).
It seems clear, however, that H ∧W is not true in S because H and W are. More
generally, H ∧W seems to be a basic truth of S: its being true in S is not explained
by other things being true in S. Rather, H ∧W is true in S simply because it is one
of the sentences that constitute the story (in this case the only one, of course). In
contrast, H does not seem to be a basic truth of S. Rather, this is true in S because
H ∧W is.us
◻SH ⊀ ◻S(H ∧W),
◻S(H ∧W) ≺ ◻SH.
Other such examples are easy to generate. For example, suppose that T is a
story of the form β, ¬β ∨ γ. en γ would be true in T because β and ¬β ∨ γ are.
But ¬β ∨ γ would certainly not hold in T because γ does.at is,
◻Tβ,◻T(¬β ∨ γ) ≺ ◻Tγ,
◻Tγ ⊀ ◻T(¬β ∨ γ).
Similarly, if a story R consists solely of ∀xφ, then ∀xφ and φ(x/t) will both be
true in R: but the truth of the former is what explains that of the latter, rather than
vice versa.
But when these facts about ctional claims are combined with the strategy of
§1.3, they yield counterexamples to the LE principles. Recall that, according to that
strategy, αP is ◻Mα. Now consider the following axiom θ of PA2:15
∀x(Nx → sx ≠ 0).
Of course, θ is true in the ‘number ction’M. So is its instance ι:
N0→ s0 ≠ 0.
But—just as in the examples above—it seems clear that θ is a basic truth ofM,
whereas ι is true inM because θ is.us
◻Mι ⊀ ◻Mθ ,
◻Mθ ≺ ◻Mι.
15Here N means: is a number; and s is the successor function.
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at is, ιP ⊀ θP, but θP ≺ ιP. But then, given the assumption that θ and ι express
the same propositions as their paraphrases, ι ⊀ θ and θ ≺ ι, in direct violation of
(∀)—indeed, giving exactly the reverse of what (∀) claims.
For another example, consider again ι, but now in relation to its component
s0 ≠ 0.16 According to (∨R), s0 ≠ 0 is a partial ground of ι. But, on the strategy
under consideration, explanation seems in fact to ow in the opposite direction.
For it seems that the reason that s0 ≠ 0 is true inM is that θ (and thus ι) is true
inM (together with the fact that N0, an axiom of PA2, is true inM). But then
ι ≺ s0 ≠ 0, rather than vice versa. Again, giving not merely the failure, but the
reversal, of the relevant LE principle. More examples along these lines are easy to
produce (see §3.1).
2.2 Consequence Strategy
As with the ction strategy, the rst point to make here is that, when it comes
to logical consequence, claims about the logically complex do not in general hold
because claims about the logically simpler do. For example, suppose β is γ ∧ δ,
where γ is Ga ∧ Gb and δ is Gc ∧ Gd, for a unary predicate G and individual
constants a, b, c and d.
Of course, γ and its conjuncts Ga and Gb are logical consequences of β. But
explanation ows from the logically complex downwards, rather than vice versa.
For the reason β entails Ga, for example, is that it entails γ, which in turn entails
Ga. In contrast, β certainly does not entail γ because it entails Ga.us,
β ⇒ γ ≺ β ⇒ Ga,
β ⇒ Ga ⊀ β ⇒ γ.
Many other examples are available. For instance,Ga togetherwithGa → ∀xGx
of course entails both ∀xGx and Gb. But it seems that the former fact is the basic
one.at is, it seems that the reason
(Ga,Ga → ∀xGx)⇒ Gb
holds is that
(Ga,Ga → ∀xGx)⇒ ∀xGx
does, rather than vice versa.
16I assume for simplicity that β → γ is dened as ¬β ∨ γ.e same point could be made without
this assumption, but we would then get a violation not of (∨R) but of a similar principle about→.
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We then get violations—indeed, reversals—of the LE principles bymeans of the
same examples as in the ction case. For, given that θ is one of the sentences that
constitutesM, the fact thatM entails θ is not explained by its entailing anything
else. In particular,
M⇒ ι ⊀M⇒ θ .
In contrast, the reason thatM entails ι does seem to be that it entails θ, i.e.
M⇒ θ ≺M⇒ ι.
But since, according to this strategy, αP isM⇒ α, this gives θ ≺ ι and ι ⊀ θ, just
as before. Similarly, the reason thatM entails s0 ≠ 0 (the consequent of ι), is that
it entails N0 and ι, i.e. ι ≺ s0 ≠ 0, rather than vice versa—this time reversing (∨R).
2.3 Counterfactual Strategy
e situation with this strategy is similar to that with the consequence one. us,
consider again the example of β = γ ∧ δ, where γ is Ga ∧ Gb and δ is Gc ∧ Gd.
Of course, β  γ and β  Ga. But it seems that the former explains the latter
rather than the other way around. For what β  Ga says is: if it were the case
that β, then a would be G. And the reason this holds would seem to be: (i) if it
were the case that β, then it would be the case that γ; and (ii) γ entailsGa. But here
we are explaining β  Ga using β  γ. is line of thought can then easily
be extended—just as with the consequence strategy—to give reversals of the LE
principles.
3 Discussion
In this section I take up a number of issues raised by the preceding arguments.
3.1 Other LE Principles
e rst is this. I have given counterexamples to (∀) and (∨R). But what about the
other LE principles—how far can the idea of §2 be taken? In one sense the answer
to this question is straightforward. If one adopts any of the strategies of §1 for nu-
merical claims, then it is hard to see what objection there could be to introducing
newmathematical concepts by similar means, i.e. using some theoryΦ of the con-
cepts, in just the way that we used PA2 there. But then, by choosing a theory with
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axioms of the right form, it will be easy to give reversals of the remaining LE prin-
ciples. For example, if Φ contains an axiom of the form β ∧ γ, then we will have
(β ∧ γ)P ≺ βP, i.e. β ∧ γ ≺ β, rather than β ≺ β ∧ γ—reasoning essentially just as we
did in §2. is is of course a reversal of (∧L) (and γ would give one of (∧R)). For
the existential case, suppose that our theory Γ contains the following axioms:
δ: ∃xHx
ξ: ∀x(x = e ∨ x = j)
η: ¬He.
On any of the strategies of §1, we would have δP, ξP and ηP explaining (Hj)P,
amounting to a reversal of (∃).
e harder question is whether we can get such additional reversals without
resorting to new theories in this way. at is, can we nd such counterexamples
involving only claims about familiar mathematical objects, such as natural or real
numbers or sets (where claims about the latter would be paraphrased using canon-
ical theories such as real analysis or ZFC)? e way that we have produced our
counterexamples so far is by focusing on sentences that are either axioms or closely
related to them. But we cannot take quite this approach in the case of (∃) and PA2,
for example: simply because ∃ does not occur in the axioms of PA2. We would
thus have to look at how explanation works, under the strategies of §1, when we
venture further from their axiomatic foundations. We may indeed be able to nd
counterexamples to all of the LE principles there—but the investigation of such
uncharted waters will not be attempted here.
3.2 Alternativeeories
Since we have exploited the specic logical forms of the axioms in giving our coun-
terexamples, it is natural to ask: might we be able to avoid these by using dierent
mathematical theories in our paraphrases, e.g. a dierent arithmetic theory in place
of PA2? In particular, a tempting thought is that we might be able to avoid the re-
versals by replacing PA2 with a theory consisting only of ‘literal’ (i.e. atomic or
negated atomic) numerical claims.
An immediate problem with this idea is that if Σ is the set of true literals of the
language of arithmetic, then it will not logically entail claims such as θ (for Σ is
obviously compatible with there being numbers beyond 0, 1 etc. and with one of
these having 0 as its successor). But this means that if we replace PA2 with Σ in
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our consequence strategy, for example, then θ would come out as false—clearly an
undesirable result. We could try to get around this by strengthening the relevant
notion of consequence. One option would be to add the (innitary) ω-rule: from
φ(n) for each n, infer ∀x(Nx → φ). Or we could add the innitary axiom
∀x(Nx → x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ . . . ).
Either of these xes would yield the right truth conditions.
e real problem, however, is that this general idea will not extend to claims
about other mathematical objects.is is starkest in the case of sets. For the move
was viable in the arithmetic case only because we have a name for each number.
But we do not of course have a name for each set, nor does there seem to be any
acceptableway of extending our language to include one. Wemight try to insist that
every set is a name of itself—so every set would now be a name of our language.
But it is hard to see how an anti-realist can help themselves to the resource of such
a language.us there does not in the end seem to be any way of avoiding the use
of logically complex axioms in our paraphrases.
3.3 Narrow-Scope Explanation
A very dierent way of trying to save a version of the LE principles would be to
move from wide-scope explanatory claims to narrow-scope ones. us, the LE
principles we have been discussing are concerned with claims of the form β ≺ γ. In
these ≺ takes wider scope than any of operators that occur in β or γ. In particular,
if β and γ are paraphrases oered in §1, then ≺ takes wider-scope than the relevant
‘paraphrase operator’, i.e.⇒, ◻M or. But one way of trying to rescue a version
of the principles is to consider instead claims in which ≺ occurs within the scope
of the relevant operator. For example, rather than a claim such as
◻Mι ≺ ◻Mθ ,
we would shi attention to
◻M(ι ≺ θ).
at is, we would paraphrase explanatory mathematical claims in the same way
that we paraphrase standard ones.e most straightforward way of implementing
this idea would simply be to add the LE principles (i.e. in essentially just the form
in which they appear in §2) to the theoryM that we used in our paraphrases.e
LE principles—understood in this narrow-scope way—of course come out as true.
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is tactic seems to do little to reduce the signicance of the arguments of §2,
however. For in thinking about mathematical explanation, it is surely the wide-
scope claims that we are principally interested in. To illustrate, consider the coun-
terfactual strategy. When we pursue the narrow-scope idea, we vindicate the LE
principles by turning them into claims about which fundamental mathematical
facts would explain which others, if numbers fundamentally existed. e reason
that we are not terribly interested in such claims is not principally that they are
about which explanatory relationships would hold in a counterfactual situation.
Aer all, on this strategy, mathematics consists of counterfactual claims.e prob-
lem with this construal of the LE principles is rather that they concern explanatory
relationships between statements made bymathematical language used fundamen-
tally. But when we engage in mathematics (according to the anti-realist views un-
der consideration) we use mathematical language supercially, i.e. to make quite
dierent statements. It is surely the explanatory relationships between these state-
ments (i.e. those wemake in the course of standard mathematical practice) that we
are principally interested in—but that requires understanding the LE principles in
the wide-scope way. And a similar point of course applies to the narrow-scope idea
pursued in connection with the other strategies of §1.
3.4 Concrete Objects
I close by considering the possibility of extending the arguments of the paper to a
dierent sort of object: namely, composite, concrete ones. Formany are attracted to
an approach to these that, at least in its broad strokes, is similar to the approach to
mathematical objects considered above.us claims such as ‘there are nitelymany
mangoes’, or ‘the Yangtze has more bridges than tunnels’, would be true, despite the
fact that the objects in question—mangoes, rivers, bridges etc.—are not to be found
among the fundamental furniture of the universe. Can our arguments be extended
to this sort of approach to concrete objects?
An initial reason for doubting this possibility is that a very dierent type of
paraphrase is oen proposed for concrete objects.e idea behind this is that when
we say ‘there are mangoes’, for example, what we are really saying is: there are sim-
ples arranged mango-wise.17 If this alternative strategy is pursued, then there does
not seem to be any prospect of extending the arguments of the paper to this do-
main.
17See van Inwagen [1990: 108–14] and Dorr and Rosen [2002].
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On the other hand, however, there are some well known drawbacks with this
strategy, which might lead to the adoption rather of one along the lines of §1: in
which case therewould seem to be every reason to expect that the argumentswould
extend to this case. First, the alternative strategy in terms of simples of course only
gets o the ground if mangoes, bridges and so on are in fact composed of these.
Indeed, if the strategy is to handle modal discourse, it would seem to require even
the impossibility of, for example, bridges that are not composed of simples. But is
it not extremely plausible that it is at least possible for there to be objects—such
as bridges—all of whose parts themselves have proper parts? Second, this strat-
egy might seem to have a problem with plural quantication—the very device that
it exploits. For, under the strategy, apparently singular quantication over com-
posite objects is in fact plural quantication over simples. But what then about
plural quantication over composite objects, as in for example the Geach-Kaplan
sentence ‘some critics admire only one another’ (which cannot be understood us-
ing only singular quantication)?is would have to be construed as ‘superplural’
quantication—i.e. over ‘pluralities of pluralities’—a device whose coherence has
been questioned.18 us, while the issue is ultimately beyond the scope of this pa-
per, there is at least some reason to think that our arguments might extend to anti-
realist approaches to composite objects. e upshot would be that in this domain
too, the commonly assumed explanatory principles are sometimes the opposite of
the truth.
We have seen, then, that a whole range of anti-realist approaches lead to violations,
indeed reversals, of standard principles relating logical and explanatory structure.
In the end, therefore, these approaches relinquish more than our external judge-
ments.19
Appendix: Axioms of PA2
Here N means: is a number; and s denotes the successor function.
(i) N0
18For this problem with the strategy, see Uzquiano [2004]. For doubts about superplurals in
general see, e.g., Lewis [1991: 70–71] or Rumtt [2005: 102]. (anks to Berta Grimau here.)
19For comments and discussion, I am grateful to Shamik Dasgupta, Louis deRosset, Gary Kemp,
Stephan Leuenberger, Adam Rieger, Raul Saucedo, Martin Smith, Zoltán Szabó, an audience at
Glasgow University, and two referees for this journal. is work was supported by the Arts and
Humanities Research Council [grant number AH/M009610/1].
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(ii) ∀x(Nx → Nsx)
(iii) ∀x(Nx → sx ≠ 0)
(iv) ∀x∀y(Nx ∧ Ny ∧ sx = sy → x = y)
(v) ∀x(Nx → x + 0 = x)
(vi) ∀x∀y[Nx ∧ Ny → x + sy = s(x + y)]
(vii) ∀x(Nx → x × 0 = 0)
(viii) ∀x∀y[Nx ∧ Ny → x × sy = (x × y) + x]
(ix) ∀X[X0 ∧ ∀y(Ny ∧ Xy → Xsy)→ ∀y(Ny → Xy)]
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